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ABSTRACT 
In the second half of the last century, both India and China have undergone major 
transitions and have moved to more liberalized economies. This paper relates the 
observed patterns in regional inequality to major events during this period. Because of 
China’s institutional barriers to migration, regional inequality is much higher than in 
India.  Also, China’s decentralization and opening up are closely related to the observed 
regional inequality – particularly the inland-coastal disparity – since the reform period. 
From the Green Revolution age to the period of economic liberalization in India, the 
evolution of regional comparative advantage has shifted from the quality of land to the 
level of human capital as India integrates with the international market. Therefore, India’s 
states have become clustered into two clubs: more educated and less educated ones.  
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 COMPARING THE EVOLUTION OF SPATIAL INEQUALITY IN 
CHINA AND INDIA: A FIFTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE 
 
 




Constituting more than one-third of the entire world’s population, and six percent 
world gross domestic product (GDP), China and India play a major role in the future of 
the world economy.  This paper seeks to understand and compare regional inequality in 
these countries, providing useful information for helping their future path, and knowledge 
that can be applied to aid the development paths of other developing economies. 
The most populated country and the second largest economy in the world 
measured in terms of purchasing power parity,
2 China has achieved tremendous successes 
in the last 30 years.  With growth in GDP around nine percent per year since the late 
1970s, China’s achievements in poverty reduction have accounted for nearly three-
quarters of developing countries’ poverty reduction in the last 20 years (World Bank, 
2005a).   
Despite such successes, however, challenges still exist.  According to the US$1 
per day poverty line of income level, approximately 100 million Chinese are considered 
income poor, and tend to be concentrated in the interior regions (World Bank, 2005a).
 3  
Under the lower official poverty line, the total number of absolute poor has stayed 
stagnant around 28 million, if not increasing (CNBS, 2004). Rising inequality may play a 
part in explaining the recent disappointing performance in poverty reduction. Rapid 
                                                 
1 Kiran Gajwani and Ravi Kanbur are respectively, a PhD Candidate and the T.H.Lee Professor of World 
Affairs and Professor of Economics at Cornell University.  Xiaobo Zhang is a Senior Research Fellow of 
IFPRI’s Development Strategy and Governance Division. 
2 In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, China’s economy is the second largest in the world (WB 2005c). 
3 The US$1/day poverty line was established by the World Bank, and is measured in 1985 PPP prices; it 
was updated to US$1.08/day in 1993 prices (WB 2006a).  If we consider consumption levels below $1/day, 
instead of income levels below $1/day, the number of poor in China rises to around 160 million (World 
Bank, 2006b).   8
growth does not guarantee that the poor can share a bigger pie if the distribution of 
wealth becomes more skewed (Ravallion and Chen, 2004). China’s struggle with regional 
inequality is one major concern in her very impressive list of achievements in the past 
decades. 
With a GDP in 2004 of $691 billion, India, the second most populous country, is 
the fourth largest economy in the world measured in purchasing parity.
 4 After instituting 
major economic reforms in the early 1990s, India has proceeded along a path of strong 
economic growth, averaging 6.8 percent annual GDP growth since 1994. Yet problems of 
poverty prevail. Over 25 percent of the population – approximately 260-290 million 
people – live below the poverty line, half of whom are concentrated in three of India's 
poorest states: Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh (World Bank, 2005b).  Three-
quarters of the poor live in rural areas, and many empirical studies
5 have found increasing 
regional inequality – particularly since 1991 when the economic reforms of liberalization 
and deregulation were instituted – in contrast to the predictions of economic theory that 
regional disparity in a federal economy will decrease with globalization (Elizondo and 
Krugman, 1992).  
Rising regional inequality will slow the trickle-down effect of growth on poverty 
reduction (Bhanumurthy and Mitra, 2004).  From a poverty reduction point of view, it is 
important to understand the patterns and causes of China and India’s regional inequality, 
as they still have the largest pockets of poor people in the world.  
A comparison of regional inequality in the two countries also has merits on the 
academic front. According to the prevailing growth theory of convergence, differences in 
growth across regions should decrease over time as the rates of returns to capital and 
labor equalize across regions and sectors. However, results of tests of convergence have 
been full of debate, in large part due to difficulties in controlling for institutional and 
cultural differences. We can apply this notion of convergence to a comparison of a cross-
                                                 
4 In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, India’s economy is the fourth largest in the world (WB 2005c). 
5 See, for example: Das and Barua (1996), Rao, Shand and Kalirajan (1999), Kurian (2000), Jha (2000), 
Roy, Venkatraman, Pradhan, and Saluja (2000).   9
section of countries, or to regions within a single country.  Being the two most populous 
countries and having large regional variations, a comparison of regional inequality in 
China and India makes an especially interesting and important testing ground for the 
convergence hypothesis.  What are the patterns of regional inequality over a long period 
of time in these two countries? What are the major driving forces behind the observed 
patterns of economic space? This paper aims to address these questions by linking the 
evolution of regional inequality with the major development strategies in the two 
countries.  
In the case of China, Kanbur and Zhang (2005) find that regional inequality over 
the second half of the last century has been closely associated with major events.  From 
the Great Famine of the 1950s through the opening up that began in the late 1980s, key 
peaks in inequality coincide with these major events. The core idea of this paper is that 
under different development strategies, a region’s comparative advantage may differ. 
Take openness as an example. During the planning era, China was a closed and primarily 
agrarian economy. Under this scenario, a region’s comparative advantage is determined 
by its land quality. However, after opening up, China’s regional comparative advantage 
needs to be evaluated at a global context. With openness, the rates of returns to labor - in 
particular skilled labor in the coastal areas - change, as well as for land. Consequently, 
the coastal regions enjoy a comparative advantage in proximity to the international 
market and in access to a large pool of well-educated labor. Coupled with the institutional 
barriers to labor mobility, though abating recently, China’s open door policy has been 
strongly associated with a widening inland-costal disparity.  
The hukou system in China, also known as the ‘household registration system,’ 
restricts living and working only to areas where one has permission, though it has 
become more flexible since the 1980s.  Liu (2005) shows that obtaining urban hukou 
status before age 15 leads to more time spent in education and improved labor market 
outcomes.  Showing that one major cause of rural-urban inequality is low education and 
low returns-to-education in rural areas, Liu argues that the hukou system plays a large 
role in China’s inequality.  Wan and Zhou (2005) show that geography plays an   10
important but decreasing role, while capital inputs are contributing more and more to 
China’s overall inequality.  Their sample uses household data from three provinces and 
three villages within each province, and they follow a decomposition of inequality using 
Shorrocks (1999) method with regression analyses.   
India has also liberalized its economy recently. In absence of restrictions on 
migration, does the same story unfold in India?  Following up on the spirit of Kanbur and 
Zhang (2005) on China, this paper uses a similar data series to look at the evolution of 
regional inequality in India in the latter half of the twentieth century. Over this period, 
India has also developed a fascinating history.  After achieving independence from 
British rule in 1947, the Indian economy has changed and developed in a multitude of 
ways.  From the first Five-Year Plan in 1951, to the 1991 liberalization reforms, to the 
tenth Five-Year Plan in 2002, India has been through border wars with China and 
Pakistan, massively increased agricultural production through Green Revolution 
technologies, and embarked on an ambitious decentralization plan.  While these events 
have surely played major roles in India’s economic growth patterns and spatial income 
distribution, few studies have focused on the development of inequality in India over the 
last 50 years.    
Most studies of regional inequality in India are generally centered on short time-
series or a snap shot of cross-sections. Das and Barua (1996) find that inter-state 
inequality is rising in agriculture, services, and the unorganized sector from 1970-1992. 
Their analysis shows that “the Indian economy continues to develop only at the cost of 
raising regional disparities” (p. 385).  However, their dataset extends only to 1992, failing 
to capture the effects of the 1991 liberalization reforms.  Noorbakhsh (2003) and Jha 
(2004) come closest to the present analysis.  Noorbakhsh (2003) conducts a spatial 
decomposition of India’s inequality, examining the influences of rural/urban areas, 
poverty, literacy, human development, child labor, and child mortality, though only 
covering the years roughly between 1981 and 2000.  He concludes that “[p]olarization 
seems to be taking place around the dimensions of literacy, female literacy, poverty and 
composite indices of human development and human poverty, though not exclusive to   11
these dimensions” (p. 27).  Jha (2004) takes a longer view, considering inequality in India 
since 1951 and presenting an excellent overview of India’s history covering this time 
period.  Using data from 1957-1997, Jha focuses particularly on the effect of the 1991 
liberalization reforms on poverty and inequality.  Examining inequality and poverty after 
1991, he finds that inequality has generally risen with India’s increased liberalization. 
However, the analyses do not engage in spatial decomposition analyses as done presently. 
Also in this paper, we extend the analysis to the year 2003.  
Using data from national and state/provincial levels over nearly a half century in 
China and India, this paper examines the patterns of regional inequality and relates them 
to the major stages of development.  The spatial decomposition of regional inequality in 
China is focused along rural-urban and inland-coastal components.  For India, we 
examine the spatial decomposition along the lines of rural-urban, inland-coastal, north-
south, literacy, and land quality.   
The next section walks through the major histories of the two countries over the 
latter half of the twentieth century. In Section III, we compare the patterns of regional 
inequality in India and China and explore its major causes. Section IV concludes.  Data 
and technical details are contained in the appendix. 
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II.  A WALK THROUGH HISTORY 
China
6 
The history of Communist China can be broken down into the following six 
periods:  1949–56, revolution and land reform; 1957–61, the Great Leap Forward and the 
Great Famine; 1962–65, post-famine recovery; 1966–78, the Cultural Revolution and 
transition to reform; 1979–84, rural reform; and 1985–present, decentralization, and 
opening up to trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Table 1 lists values of Gini coefficients of real per capita consumption across 
provinces/states over the entire range of the data, while Figure 1 illustrates that the peaks 
of inequality occurred during periods (ii), (iv) and (vi): the Great Famine in the late 
1950s, the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s, and booming global integration 



































Source: The data for China are from Kanbur and Zhang (2005).  The time-series for 
India is calculated by the authors. 
 
Figure 1.  Regional Inequality in China and India 
 
                                                 
6 This section is largely from Kanbur and Zhang (2005).   Table 1.  Inequalities, Openness and Decentralization in China
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   Using GE 
Year 
Gini GE  Rural-Urban  Inland-Coastal 
Openness Decentralization 
1952 25 9 10 9 72 3 24 95 25 9
1953 26.4 11.5  76.1 3.0 9.8 26.1
1954 24.8 10.1  79.1 2.9 9.9 24.7
1955 23.4  8.9  73.3 1.1 12.1 23.5
1956 25.1 10.3  79.6 0.7 10.6 29.6
1957 26.0 10.8  73.8 0.2 9.8 29.0
1958 26.6 11.3  80.8 0.9 9.8 55.7
1959 32.3 16.5  80.1 0.9 10.4 54.1
1960 32.5 16.8  73.7 1.8 8.8 56.7
1961 30.7 14.9  77.5 1.4 7.4 55.0
1962 29.3 13.6  73.2 0.6 7.0 38.4
1963 28.0 12.7  73.1 0.6 6.9 42.1
1964 28.7 13.6  74.5 0.8 6.7 42.9
1965 28.1 12.9  72.7 0.4 6.9 38.2
1966 27.2 12.1  73.0 0.3 6.8 36.9
1967 27.2 12.1  78.6 0.1 6.3 38.7
1968 27.7 12.4  76.3 0.4 6.3 38.7
1969 27.8 12.9  78.5 0.8 5.5 39.3
1970 28.4 13.1  75.4 0.6 5.0 41.1
1971 28.3 13.1  77.0 0.6 5.0 40.5
1972 28.0 13.1  83.2 1.0 5.8 43.7
1973 27.7 12.9  83.3 1.2 8.1 44.4
1974 28.5 13.6  83.2 1.4 10.5 49.7
1975 28.9 14.0  82.3 1.8 9.7 50.1
1976 29.2 14.6  85.6 2.2 9.6 53.2
1977 29.1 14.5  85.8 2.4 8.5 53.3
1978 28.0 13.6  89.3 2.0 9.8 52.6
1979 27.4 12.9  87.3 2.0 11.3 48.9
1980 26.8 12.0  82.7 3.5 12.6 45.7
1981 25.9 10.9  78.9 4.5 15.1 45.0
1982 23.7  9.0  77.8 5.0 14.5 47.0
1983 22.6  8.2  76.0 6.0 14.4 46.1
1984 22.6  8.1  74.6 7.3 16.7 47.5
1985 23.3  8.6  76.4 7.1 23.0 60.3
1986 24.0  9.2  75.0 7.9 25.3 62.1
1987 24.9  9.8  73.7 8.1 25.8 62.6
1988 25.5 10.3  72.5 9.0 25.6 66.1
1989 26.1 10.6  68.8 8.8 24.6 68.5
1990 26.9 11.4  70.8 6.5 29.9 67.4
1991 27.5 12.0  69.9 5.4 33.4 67.8
1992 28.9 13.0  66.2 5.8 34.2 68.7
1993 30.2 14.4  70.4 4.8 32.6 71.7
1994 30.5 14.6  65.1 5.9 43.7 69.7
1995 30.4 14.6  66.1 7.6 40.9 70.8
1996 29.7 13.9  67.0 8.2 36.1 72.9
1997 30.0 14.2  65.5 8.8 36.9 72.6
1998 30.6 14.9  66.9 9.4 34.4 71.1
1999 31.8 16.1  69.7 10.5 36.4 68.5
2000 33.0 17.4  72.1 10.3 40.1 65.3
2001 33.4 17.9  70.2 11.3 39.0 69.5
2002 34.6 19.3  70.7 11.3 43.1 69.3
2003 35.2 19.9  72.3 13.3 52.1 69.9
2004 35.4 20.3  72.0 11.6 59.9 72.3
Notes for Table 1: 
1)  Data prior to 1979 are adapted from Kanbur and Zhang (2005) and the later years are calculated by authors based 
on data from China Statistical Yearbooks (various years).  
2)  The Gini coefficient measures overall, inter-provincial inequality. 
3)  The GE measure gives overall, inter-provincial inequality.  The GE measure can be decomposed into within and 
between group inequality: Rural-Urban and Inland-Coastal give the percentage of total inequality (measured 
using GE) that is due to inequality between each of these groups. 
4)  Openness is measured using the Trade/GDP ratio: [(exports + imports)/GDP]*100.  
5)  Decentralization is a measure of fiscal decentralization: (Total local government expenditures/Total government 
expenditures)*100.   14
From the beginning of the time-series in 1952, we can see that inequality was 
initially low, but began rising during the Great Leap Forward and the Great Famine, 
peaking in 1960. Though inequality fell in the period following the Great Famine, it rose 
again during the Cultural Revolution, peaking in 1976.  While inequality again fell during 
the rural reform period, it then began to increase in the mid-1980s and has continued on 
an increasing path since.  This steadily increasing inequality coincides precisely with 
China’s opening up to trade and foreign direct investment, and decentralization efforts.  
The Gini and Generalized Entropy values in Table 1 show that inequality measures from 
1994 onwards are in fact the highest of all preceding years.   
Measures of decentralization and openness are also given in Table 1, from which 
we can see both values taking a leap in 1985, coinciding with the third and continual 
upswing in Chinese inequality.  China’s implementation of a more decentralized structure 
provided incentives for local governments to aim for strong economic growth.  Due to 
historical disadvantages of certain regions, however, this decentralized structure led to 
disparate growth rates across regions and, therefore, to worsening regional inequality.  
Additionally, largely agricultural regions have less of a revenue base vis-à-vis those 
regions with industrial and more diverse economic compositions.The trend toward 
greater openness in trade started in the mid-1980s, after virtually no changes in activity 
since the 1950s, as shown from the values in Table 1.  Since the 1980s, China has also 
become the leading recipient of FDI among all developing countries, as well as touting 
annual growth in exports of 11 percent on average.  To facilitate fast development and 
integration into the world economy, China implemented many ‘coastal-biased’ policies – 
such as special tax breaks and economic zones – to encourage FDI in coastal areas.  The 
result, while leading to very successful development in coastal regions and integration of 
China in the world market, has been a grossly uneven distribution of gains across 
provinces.  An example makes this point clear: coastal Guangdong changed its labor 
productivity rank among China’s provinces from 14
th in 1978 to being one of the top 
provinces in 2003, while inland Sichuan moved from 15
th to 23
rd in the same time frame.  
This is merely an example of a countrywide trend among China’s provinces.            15
India  
India’s recent history can be divided into three major periods: : before 1966, the 
pre-Green Revolution period, characterized by lower levels of GDP growth; 1966–90, 
higher levels of growth due in large part to introduction of Green Revolution 
technologies; and  1991–present, higher levels of growth due to liberalization reforms 
(see Jha 2004).  This third period was also witness to the implementation of the 73
rd 
Constitutional Amendment, in which India made major strides in formal decentralization 
at a sub-state level.
7    
Table 2 lists several measures for India’s inequality, level of trade openness, and 
level of decentralization over almost 50 years.  In the pre-1966, pre-Green Revolution 
years, we observe decreasing inequality.  The ending of the Zamindari system – a feudal-
type system in which peasants pay a landlord, who owns all the land, for the right to farm 
the land – occurred in this period immediately following India’s independence (Jha, 
2004).  The observed falling Gini values during this time may possibly be attributed, in 
part, to gains to poor peasants as a result of no longer needing to pay fees to a landlord. 
Use of semi-dwarf, high-yielding varieties of seeds, and the adoption of irrigation 
and fertilization techniques starting in 1966, led to the ‘Green Revolution’ that helped 
India become self-sufficient in grain production by the late 1970’s.  Some of the many 
results of this phenomenal agriculture achievement were a drastic drop in poverty – 
particularly rural poverty – improved nutrition, and higher incomes.  However, due to the 
adoption of semi-dwarf wheat varieties in India’s Northwestern states which have 
superior irrigation facilities, regional inequalities widened (USLOC, 2005).  From Table 
2, we see that in 1969, both the Gini and GE values begin an upward trend.  Though 
briefly dipping downwards in 1974 and 1984, this upwards trend continued slowly from 
1969 through to the late 1990s.  The values in Table 2 indicate a jump in the inequality 
measures in 1997, continuing on an upward trend until the end of the data set.  This jump 
                                                 
7 India’s 73
rd Constitutional Amendment was proposed in 1992, passed by both Houses of Parliament in 
1993, and required each state to detail its plans for decentralizing powers to the three tiers of Panchayats.  
Most states held their first elections in 1995 and after.    16
in 1997 may be attributed to India’s economic reforms of the 1990s, to which we now 
turn. 
Following the Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985-1990), the 1990-1991 crisis hit, 
provoked by the cumulative effect of political instability at home, the collapse of India’s 
largest trading partner – the Soviet Union – and the Gulf War that resulted in higher oil 
prices and affected exports to the Middle East.  With growth falling, inflation soaring and 
a public sector deficit at nearly 10 percent of GDP, India turned to the International 
Monetary Fund and began major economic policy reforms, centered around liberalization 
(Roy, 2001).  The aforementioned upswing in inequality in the mid-1990s potentially 
illustrates a lagged effect of increased inequality correlated with India’s increased 
openness. 
Some say liberalization first started in 1966 with a devaluation of the rupee (Das and 
Barua, 1996).  However, despite previous attempts at greater liberalization, heavy 
protectionist barriers stood in place in India for decades prior to the early 1990’s (IEO, 
1997).  In 1988, 75-80 percent of items imported to India were subject to import 
restrictions, as compared to less than 5 percent for Malaysia, Thailand and the Republic 
of Korea, 10 percent for the Philippines, and 22 percent for Indonesia (Majumdar, 2001). 
Complicated export procedures led India’s share of world exports to decline from nearly 
2 percent in 1950 to 0.5 percent in 1990.  This closed economy created many problems, 
and resulted in the post-1991 reforms being heavily focused on liberalizing India’s 
economy.  
The liberalization brought about by these reforms significantly changed the 
landscape of India's economy.  Theoretically, one may expect to see decreasing inequality 
as a country becomes more open and liberal with trade.  However, Ravallion (2003) 
reviews the literature on globalization and inequality, showing that empirical studies 
provide an ambiguous answer to what is the effect of increased liberalization on 
inequality.  The upward swing in inequality illustrated in Figure 1 shows the coinciding 
of liberalization policies and increased inequality in India.     Table 2.  Inequalities, Openness and Decentralization in India
1 
Using GE 
Year  Gini 
(nominal) 
Gini 





1958 12.1 11.7 2.1  43.0  2.4  1.7  5.1 10.8 0.7   
1959 12.7 10.7 1.9  35.1  8.2  8.8  3.9 11.3 0.8   
1960 11.8 10.8 1.9  40.2  1.2  2.2  5.2 18.9 0.8  47.9 
1961 11.8 10.1 1.6  40.6  2.7  2.2  6.5 12.1 0.8  47.2 
1962 10.9  9.8 1.5  51.0  0.0  0.0  13.7 15.0 0.8  48.1 
1964 10.0  8.4 1.2  67.7  0.1  0.1  10.3 19.2 0.8  50.0 
1965 9.0  9.5 1.5 49.3  2.8  0.1  2.1 19.7 0.8  46.4 
1966 8.5  9.8 1.6 42.3  5.6  3.0  0.1 15.7 1.2  45.4 
1967 9.4 11.4  2.1 44.7  6.1  5.0  0.6 13.7 1.2  46.4 
1968 8.8 10.5  1.8 53.5  6.3  6.8  0.3 15.6 1.1  46.1 
1969 10.5 10.7 1.9  52.4  0.4  0.0  6.9 15.7 1.0  45.5 
1970 10.3 10.6 1.9  57.8  0.4  0.1  5.0 15.6 1.0  48.6 
1971 11.1 11.3 2.0  64.2  0.0  0.4  9.4 15.0 1.0  49.9 
1973 11.3 10.8 2.0  51.1  0.4  0.1  9.9 13.6 1.4  49.9 
1974 8.6  8.0 1.1 53.2  0.8  0.0  6.3 19.3 2.1  48.3 
1978 12.3 10.1 1.6  37.5  0.0  2.5  7.6 12.1 2.7  48.6 
1984 11.5 10.5 1.8  61.4  6.7  10.7 21.7 12.8 5.2  47.7 
1987 13.2  9.8 1.5  68.0  3.4  4.7  15.3 11.1 5.8  46.0 
1988 12.6  9.6 1.5  68.7  3.4  6.4  15.9 9.4  6.6  45.1 
1990 13.6 10.9 1.9  68.7  1.1  2.6  10.4 8.3  9.4  46.7 
1991 13.9 10.9 1.9  71.1  1.5  2.2  11.4 12.0 11.1  45.9 
1993 14.5 13.4 2.8  64.9  6.5  6.9  17.8 10.9 15.7  45.2 
1994 14.5 12.2 2.4  66.6  5.1  8.0  18.2 9.4 17.6  47.9 
1995 14.7  9.8 1.7  60.1  4.7  13.0 15.8 7.6 21.3  47.2 
1996 14.7  9.7 1.6  72.6  2.8  7.7  12.2 11.0 23.6  48.1 
1997 16.1 11.1 2.0  60.4  6.4  14.7 19.0 6.0 24.9  50.0 
1998 17.6 10.2 1.7  67.3  5.5  9.5  15.6 11.4 26.7  46.4 
2000 16.9 11.2 2.0  67.8  5.1  10.9 22.2 9.8 32.1  45.4 
2001 18.2 10.8 1.8  69.8  12.1  17.8 24.8 9.9 32.0  46.4 
2002 19.7 11.8 2.2  74.4  10.2  15.6 20.5 10.8 35.7  46.1 
2003 19.0 11.4 2.1  67.6  9.7  15.9 23.3 7.9 38.2  45.5 
Notes for Table 2: 
1)  The years are not continuous because in some years the consumption expenditure data are not available. 
2)  The Gini coefficient measures overall, inter-state inequality. 
3)  The GE measure gives overall, inter-state inequality.  The GE measure can be decomposed into within and between group inequality: Rural-Urban, 
Inland-Coastal, North-South, High-Low Literacy, and High-Low Irrigation give the percentage of total inequality (measured using GE) that is due to 
inequality between each of these groups. 
4)  Openness is measured using the Trade/GDP ratio: [(exports + imports)/GDP]*100.  
5)  Decentralization is a measure of fiscal decentralization: (Total state government expenditures/Total central and state government expenditures)*100. 
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Decentralization was India’s other major policy implemented in the 1990s.  The 
enactment of the 73rd Amendment to the Constitution was a major step towards 
strengthening local governance in India, giving Panchayats Raj Institutions (PRIs) 
constitutional status by specifying a three-tier structure of Panchayats and bestowing 
upon them decision-making power in 29 areas.  ‘Panchayats’ - meaning ‘village 
councils’ and requiring a minimum of five members elected every five years (“panch” 
means “five”) - have been present in Indian society for centuries and traditionally served 
as the village governments (PCGI, 2001; Montes, 2002).  Currently, India has about 500 
districts, 6000 blocks and 230,000 village Panchayats.
8  While the creation of three levels 
of PRIs was mandatory for all states meeting certain requirements, each state can exercise 
discretion in choosing which areas to assign to the PRIs, as well as how the PRIs will be 
funded. 
Developing a theoretical framework, Bardhan & Mookherjee (2000) examine the 
role of decentralization  on anti-poverty program delivery and, subsequently, inter-
regional equality.  Their model illustrates a potential for increased political capture in 
poorer regions, resulting in decentralization leading to greater inequality.  Preliminary 
work by Gajwani (2004) finds empirical support for this claim, showing significantly less 
gain from decentralization for poorer states vis-à-vis wealthier states. 
To the extent that decentralization can lead to increases in a country’s openness
9, 
the effects of China’s and India’s decentralization on inequality may be two-fold.  If 
openness actually leads to increases in inequality, and decentralization alone may be 
expected to lead to increases in inequality (as per Bardhan and Mookherjee 2000) and 
increases in openness, the overall  effect of decentralization may lead to greatly 
worsening inequality.    
 
                                                 
8 See Mahal, Srivastava and Sanan (2000) for a detailed description of functions, duties, et cetera of each 
level of each state’s Panchayats.   
9 Alesina and Spolaore (1997) present a theoretical argument of a positive openness-decentralization link, 
demonstrated empirically by Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (1997) and Gajwani (2004).  Garrett and 
Rodden (2001) find support for a negative link.    
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III.  PATTERNS AND CORRELATES - COMPARING CHINA AND INDIA 
Having briefly presented the relevant history of China and India since the mid-
twentieth century, this section compares the patterns of regional inequality and relates 
them to each country’s major events. Table 1 reports two commonly used inequality 
measures: the Gini coefficient and GE index when c=0,
10 based on real expenditures in 
China. In addition, rural-urban and inland-coastal polarization measures are listed, which 
equal the percentage of between-group inequality in overall GE. Concerning the 
discrepancy between nominal and real inequality (Milanovic, 2005), we present both 
nominal and real Gini coefficients for India in Table 2.  Figure 1 plots the real regional 
Gini coefficient in China, and the nominal and real regional Gini coefficients in India.  
Several findings are apparent from the comparison in Figure 1. First, in terms of 
levels, China’s regional inequality has been consistently higher than India’s. The degree 
of restrictions on migration might be a key reason for the observed pattern. Fully 
removing the institutional barriers to migration in China is a slow process, while India 
has never created institutional barriers to prevent rural people from migrating to cities.  
Second, nominal and real inequalities follow each other quite well until 1994.  
From 1994 onwards, they diverge, with real inequality levels consistently lower than 
nominal values.  However, from the year 2000 onwards, they move in the same direction, 
albeit with a gap in between.  Considering the heated debate on the comparability 
problem between the 55
th round (1999/2000) of the NSS survey and previous surveys 
(Deaton and Kozel, 2005), it is necessary to check whether the discrepancy is due to a 
comparability problem or our adjustment of the price index. Table 3 compares Gini 
coefficients based on five different sets of expenditures. The second and third columns 
are the nominal and real inequality measures reported in Table 2. The figures in the 
fourth and fifth columns are based on ‘inequality adjusted’ and ‘inequality and inflation 
                                                 
10 c is a parameter defined in GE measures of inequality.  It represents the weight given to differences in 
incomes at different parts of the income distribution, and can take on any value.  A value of c=0 means 
differences in incomes in the lower tail of the income distribution are given more weight than differences 
between incomes in the upper tail of the distribution.  
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adjusted’ expenditures from the National Human Development Report 2001 (PCGI, 
2002). Kijima and Lanjouw (2003) make a concerted effort to adjust the 1999/00 survey 
to restore comparability with previous surveys. The last column is calculated based on 
their adjusted expenditures. However, they do not report the data in Jammu and Kashmir 
which is included in the calculations in other columns.  
Table 3.  Gini Coefficients in India based on Nominal and Real Consumption 
Expenditures  








1984 11.5  10.5  10.7  10.7   
1994 14.5  12.2  13.3  10.4   
2000 16.8  11.2  14.9  11.9  8.9 
Note: The figures are calculated by the authors based on unadjusted and adjusted per capita expenditure 
data. The nominal expenditures are those reported directly in the NSS surveys. Özler, Datt, and Ravallion 
(1996) have made every effort to adjust the expenditure data for the period of 1958 to 1993. We expand 
their series by adjusting the expenditures using the CPI data from the Indian Labour Journal since then. 
The National Human Development Report 2001 (PCGI, 2002) also reports the ‘inequality adjusted’ and 
‘inequality and inflation adjusted’ expenditures at the state level with a rural-urban breakdown. Kijima 
and Lanjouw (2003) adjust the 2000 NSSO data to make it more comparable with previous NSSO rounds of 
household survey data. However, they do not report the data in Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the Gini 
coefficient for the last column is based on 15 states as opposed to 16 states in other columns.  
 
All of the inequality measures based on adjusted expenditures are greater than the 
nominal measures.  In terms of magnitude, the GKZ adjusted values are closest to the 
NHDR inequality and inflation adjusted values. The Gini coefficient based on the 
adjusted expenditures by Kijima and Lanjouw (2003) is 8.9, lower than any other 
estimation. The comparison reinforces Milanovic’s (2005) observation about the 
existence of a discrepancy. However, while we find that the nominal inequality is lower 
than real inequality for per capita GDP, Milanovic’s finding is of higher nominal 
inequality. But because the GDP data do not have a rural and urban divide, the two 
findings are not totally comparable. Therefore, whether the nominal or real 
expenditures/GDP are more accurate for measuring inequality remains an open question. 
To maintain consistency with the analysis of China, we use real inequality measures for 
India throughout the remaining analysis.   
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Third, patterns of regional inequality in China are more variable than in India, 
particularly before 1978. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the 
Communist Revolution, the Great Leap Forward, the Great Famine, the Cultural 
Revolution, and the economic reforms in China, with three peaks of inequality coinciding 
with these major events.  India, being a democratic regime, has not undergone such 
extreme events as in China, therefore exhibiting a smoother pattern in regional inequality 
during this period.  
Fourth, the acceleration of regional inequality coincides with the timing of 
economic liberalization in the two countries. China’s opening up started after the success 
of rural reforms in the mid-1980s, while India’s economic liberalization has sped up after 
1991. This result reinforces the findings by Milanovic (2005), which are based on 
regional GDP data.  
Next we look at the components of between-group inequality along different 
dimensions. Following the policy debate in China, Table 1 reports rural-urban and inland-
coastal polarizations: the ratio of between-group inequality to total inequality as defined 
in Appendix I. In India, the debate on inland-coastal disparity is not as pronounced as in 
China. A more diversified classification, such as north-south, high literacy and low 
literacy states, has appeared in the policy arena. Therefore, Table 2 presents 
decompositions along more dimensions than in China.
11  
Figure 2 further plots rural-urban polarization indices in China and India over a 
long time period. Before the early 1980s, China’s rural-urban polarization was 
consistently higher than that of India. In the 1950s, in order to carry out the heavy-
industry development strategy, China implemented a strict Hukou system to limit 
migration, creating an enormous rural-urban gap; China’s rural-urban gap is one of the 
highest in the world (Eastwood and Lipton, 2000). With the success of rural reforms from 
the late 1970s to the middle 1980s, farmers’ incomes significantly increased. Therefore 
                                                 
11 Although there are some discrepancies in nominal and real inequality measures, the decomposition 
analyses based on nominal and real expenditure give rather consistent findings.  To save pages, we report 
only decompositions based on real expenditures. The results for nominal ones are available upon request.   
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the gap has narrowed and leveled off at around 60 since then. During almost the same 







































Figure 2.  Rural-Urban Inequality in India and China 
 
Fiscal decentralization and trade liberalization are the two most important aspects 
of the economic liberalization policies in the two countries over the past two decades.  
We employ two policy variables – the degree of fiscal decentralization and the degree of 
openness – to examine their relationship with the patterns of regional inequality. Figures 
3 and 4 graph the evolution of decentralization and regional inequality in China and 
India. Both figures show a pattern of co-movement between fiscal decentralization and 
regional inequality.
13  It seems that greater decentralization increases regional inequality 
during the economic transition from a planned economy to a market economy. Under a 
central planning system, the central government has large powers to allocate and utilize 
financial revenues to achieve the goal of equity at the expense of efficiency.  With 
economic reforms, the central government has granted local governments more autonomy 
in allocating their resources and more responsibilities, but perhaps at the cost of equity. 
                                                 
12 The polarization measures does not show much difference between the two countries in the later years, 
although China's rural-urban gap in terms of mean expenditures in rural and urban areas is much higher. 
The reason is that China's within-rural and within-urban inequalities are also much larger. It should be 
aware that the polarization measure is defined as the ratio of mean difference to overall inequality. 
13 Due to data limitations, the fiscal decentralization variable starts only from 1970.   
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When a spatially large country opens up, certain regions with geographic 
advantages will benefit more from easy access to the international market. In China’s 
case, the coastal region has attracted most of the FDI (Zhang and Zhang, 2003). In India, 
the policy debate has been mainly focused on the north and south. Figures 5 and 6 
illustrate the correlates of openness and inland-coastal inequality in China and India, 
respectively.
14  The correlation between openness and inland-coastal inequality in China 
appears to be strong. Both series were stagnant through the early 1980s and then took off.  
The relationship is less obvious in India’s case. India’s trade patterns are different from 
China’s, in that India’s service sector plays a larger role than the manufacturing sector. In 
a country dominated by trade in manufactured goods, such as China, nearness to a port 
becomes a critical factor. However, in countries with intensive trade in the service sector, 
the physical geographic requirement may become less important than the soft human 
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Source: Caculation by authors. 
Figure 3.  Decentralization and Regional Inequality in China 
                                                 
14 The coastal states include Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, 
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Source: Calculations by authors. 






































































































Figure 6.  Openness and Polarization along Different Dimensions in India 
 
In Figure 6, we also present openness and north-south inequality in India.
15  The 
pattern is similar to the inland-coastal inequality. The widening polarization between the 
south and the north since the early 1990s may be due to differences in initial education 
levels: the literacy rate in the south was 54 percent compared to 39 percent in the north in 
                                                 
15 The southern states include Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.   
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1981.
16  The southern people, being more educated, are better placed to exploit new 
economic opportunities in the wake of globalization. When decomposing inequality into 
two groups based on whether the literacy level is above or below the national average, it 
appears the correlation between literacy polarization and openness is stronger that the 
inland-coastal and north-south polarizations (Figure 6).
17   
During the Green Revolution era, land quality may have been a more important 
factor in determining a region’s comparative advantage, but in an increasingly integrated 
world, the rate of returns to education in India may have risen. To test this idea, we 
further classify Indian states into those with a value below the Indian average and those 
above based on the ratio of irrigated land in total arable land in 1970.
18  Figure 7 presents 
the polarization measures for literacy and irrigated land. In general, land quality plays a 
more dominant role than literacy in affecting the overall regional inequality prior to the 
mid-1980s: the ending of the Green Revolution period. However, literacy has since 
become a more prominent divide. This finding is consistent with Noorbakhsh (2003) that 






































Figure 7.  The Contributions of Literacy and Land Quality Inequalities 
to Overall Regional Inequality 
                                                 
16 Calculations done by the authors based on literacy data at the state level from National Human 
Development Report 2001 (PCGI, 2002).  
17 The literacy data is for 1981 and available from National Human Development Report 2001 (PCGI, 
2002).  




This study examines patterns of regional inequality and tries to understand the 
driving forces behind its changes in China and India, using data covering most of the 
latter half of the twentieth century. We find that the evolution of inequality matches 
different political-economic periods in history.   
By decomposing inequality into components due to inequality between rural-
urban, inland-coastal, northern-southern, high-low literacy, and high-low irrigation areas, 
we see a shift in the contributions to China’s and India’s inequality.  Disparities between 
rural and urban areas are accounting for a decreasing share of provincial inequality in 
China, while the inland-coastal divide is playing an increasingly larger role. The rapid 
increase in China’s inland-coastal disparities in the 1980s and 1990s is correlated with 
the increasing openness and decentralization reforms of that period. In India, along with 
the transition from the Green Revolution to economic liberalization, the determinants of 
regional comparative advantage have also shifted from the quality of land to the level of 
human capital, thereby defining the landscape of regional inequality along different 
dimensions.  Therefore, India’s states have become clustered into two clubs: more 
educated and less educated ones. 
The empirical findings are also relevant to the ongoing debate on globalization’s 
effects on regional inequality in developing countries. Convergence or divergence of a 
nation’s economy is dependent upon not only its domestic polices but also on its 
openness.  Our results here show that openness has lead to changes and increases in 
regional inequality via providing more favorable conditions for growth for coastal and 
better-educated regions.  The implications for policy are a need to pay careful attention to 
those regions which are less able to take advantage of gains from openness.  In China, 
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APPENDIX – DATA AND MEASURES 
The China Data   
All data and calculations are shown in Table 1.  GDP values over the entire period 
1952-2000 come from the China Statistical Yearbook (2001).  The per capita 
consumption data (at the provincial level) from 1952 to 1998 come from Comprehensive 
Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNBS 1999), while various 
issues of the China Statistical Yearbook provide the consumption data for later years. The 
consumption expenditures are comparable across years.  For details on the construction 
of the data series, see Kanbur and Zhang (2005, Data Appendix).  
Population data were used as weights in order to calculate the inequality 
measures.  Data on total and rural population from 1952 to 1977 come from 
Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNSB 1999) 
and Regional Historical Statistical Materials Compilation (1949–1989) (CNSB 1989). 
Data of total and rural population from 1978 to 1998 are from Comprehensive 
Agricultural Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNSB 2000).  
Values for total and rural population after 1998 come from China Statistical Yearbooks 
and China Agricultural Statistical Yearbooks (CNSB 1999-2005). 
Decentralization is approximated as the ratio of local to total government 
expenditures, representing an estimate of fiscal decentralization.
19  The 1952 data come 
from Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China (CNSB 
1999), while the 1953–2000 data are available in the 2001 edition of the China Statistical 
Yearbook (CNSB 2001). Data after 2000 are from the 2006 edition of China Statistical 
Yearbook (CNSB 2006). 
Measuring China’s openness to trade was done via the commonly used 
Trade/GDP ratio.  Data on total exports and imports from 1952-1998 come from 
                                                 
19 In the literature, three broad types of decentralization are generally referred to: administrative, fiscal and 
political decentralization.  See, for example, von Braun and Grote (2002) and Litvack and Seddon (2000) 
for an in-depth discussion of each type.  
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Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 Years of New China, while values 
for 1999-2004 are found in the 2006 edition of China Statistical Yearbook (CNSB 2006). 
The India Data  
All data and calculations are presented in Table 2.  GDP data for 1957-2003 come 
from the Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy (2005, Table 2), available from the 
Reserve Bank of India website (http://www.rbi.org.in).  The population data – used for 
weighting the inequality measures – come from the Census of India publications for 
every ten-year interval from 1951-2001.  Values in-between each interval are interpolated 
by assuming constant growth in each of the nine intervening years. 
It has been noted in the literature (Milanovic, 2005) that inequality measures 
based on real and nominal expenditures, in particular over a long time period, may result 
in discrepancies. By comparing inequality measures based on nominal and real per capita 
expenditures in India, Milanovic (2005) finds that the real-based regional inequality is 
higher than that calculated from nominal GDP. Therefore, we consider both nominal and 
real expenditures at the state level for India. There are 16 states in our sample. With rural 
and urban components for each state, we have 32 observations per year for 31 years from 
1957 to 2003. Several missing values are interpolated to ensure each year has the same 
number of states.  
We obtained India’s nominal per-capita monthly expenditure data from Özler, 
Datt, and Ravallion (1996) and the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) for the 
entire 1957-2003 time series (http://mospi.nic.in/mospi_nsso_rept_pubn.htm). These 
expenditure data come from the NSSO household surveys and are presented at the state 
level, and are available for most of the years from 1957-2003, dependent upon the 
schedule of the NSSO.  The data for the period of 1957-1994 are obtained from the 
World Bank’s A Database on Poverty and Growth in India (Özler, Datt, and Ravallion, 
1996).  Summary reports can be downloaded directly from the NSSO website, where we 
obtained the expenditure data for the years of the survey between 1995-2003.   
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For measures of real expenditures, we use nominal expenditures and state-level 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures for rural and urban areas; the CPI for Agricultural 
Laborers (CPIAL) is used to deflate expenditures in rural areas, while the CPI for 
Industrial Workers (CPIIW) is used for urban expenditures.  These price indices data 
come from Özler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996) for the years in between 1957-1994, and 
from the Indian Labour Journal for 1995-2003.   
India’s fiscal decentralization is measured as the ratio of total state expenditures 
to central government expenditures.  Due to difficulty in obtaining data before 1960, our 
decentralization variable is constructed for the years 1960-2003.  From 1970 onwards, all 
expenditure data are available from the on-line database Indiastat (indiastat.com).  Data 
from 1960-1969 were obtained from the Ministry of Finance Indian Public Finance 
Statistics publication, available in the National Institute of Public Finance and Policy 
Library in New Delhi, India. 
The Trade/GDP ratio was again used to measure India’s openness to trade.  Data 
on total exports and imports for the entire 1952-2003 range were obtained from the 
International Monetary Fund’s International Finance Statistics online database 
(http://ifs.apdi.net/imf/about.asp). 
The state-level irrigation data are from Fan, Hazell and Thorat (1999) and the 
state-level literacy data are from National Human Development Report 2001 (PCGI, 
2002).  
Measures 
We use per capita consumption expenditure data at the provincial/state level with 
a rural and urban divide over a long time period: the China data cover 1952-2000, while 
the India data cover most of the years from 1957-2003.  Therefore, we are measuring 
regional inequality by holding all the observations the same within each unit.   
  35
Applying population weights to data on per capita consumption/expenditure, we 
obtain a measure of real per-capita consumption/expenditures.
20  Using all of the 
information gathered, we construct two measures of inequality: (i) the standard Gini 
coefficient of inequality and (ii) a measure from the decomposable generalized entropy 
class (GE) of inequality measures (Shorrocks, 1980, 1984).
21  The benefit of using this 
latter measure is that it is additively decomposable, allowing inequality across groups to 
be broken down into within-group inequality and between-group inequality.   
 












   (1) 
In the above equation, yi is the i
th income measured in local currency unit, μ is the 
total sample mean, f(yi) is the population share of yi in the total population, and n is total 
population. For parameter c less than 2, the measure is transfer sensitive, in the sense that 
it is more sensitive to transfers at the bottom end of the income distribution than those at 
the top. The key feature of the GE measure is that it is additively decomposable. For K 
exogenously given, mutually exclusive and exhaustive, groups indexed by g: 
   (2) 
                                                 
20 Owing to data availability, we use per capita consumption measures for China and per capita expenditure 
measures for India.  
21 Details of calculations using this measure can be found in Kanbur and Zhang (2005).    
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In equation 2, Ig is inequality in the g
th group, μg is the mean of the g
th group and 
eg is a vector of 1’s of length ng, where ng is the population of the g
th group. If n is the 
total population of all groups, then fg=ng/n  represents the share of the g
th group’s 
population in the total population. The first term on the right hand side of (2) represents 
the within-group inequality. The second term is the between group, or inter-group, 
component of total inequality.  For simplicity, we present results in this paper only for c 
= 0. The within-group inequality part in (2) represents the spread of the distributions in 
the subgroups; the between-group inequality indicates the distance between the group 
means. Following Zhang and Kanbur (2001), we define the ratio of the between-group 
inequality in total inequality as a polarization index. In other words, it measures the 
contribution of the between-group inequality. 
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